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About the Study: The Rule of Law and Mexico’s Energy Reform/Estado 
de Derecho y Reforma Energética en México 
 
The 2013 changes to the constitutional framework and the summer 2014 enabling 
legislation in Mexico’s energy industry represent a thorough break with the prevailing 
national narrative as well as the political and legal traditions of twentieth century Mexico. 
Mexico is about to embark on an unprecedented opening of its energy sector in the midst 
of important unknown factors, as well as a fiercely competitive and expanding 
international energy market. Mexico is one of the last developing countries to open its 
energy sector to foreign investment, and although there are important lessons that can be 
learned from other countries’ experiences, this does not imply that the opening will be 
necessarily as successful as the government promises or that the implementation of the 
new laws will go smoothly. Almost certainly, after the enabling legislation goes into effect, 
important questions of law will emerge during the implementation, and unavoidably, 
refinements to the legislation will have to take place.  
 
The book “Estado de Derecho y Reforma Energética en México,” published in México by 
Tirant lo Blanch and written in Spanish, is the culmination of a major research effort to 
examine rule of law issues arising under the energy reform in Mexico by drawing on 
scholars and experts from American and Mexican institutions in order to bring attention to 
the different component parts of the new Mexican energy sector from a legal standpoint. 
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Introduction 
 
The institutional arrangement of the hydrocarbons reform 2013 in Mexico cannot be 
understood without analyzing the design and the basic position of its industry regulators, 
in this case the National Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH) and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (CRE).1 As soon as the political commitment was made to open the 
oil and gas industry up to private investment, the consideration of the regulators’ design 
and capacity to set up a new industry could no longer be delayed. Until the time of the 
reform, the industry had acquiesced to some small regulators that were attached to the 
Ministry of Energy (SENER) as decentralized bodies and possessed a portfolio of legal 
competencies that, although not immense, have not been fully performed due to 
budgetary and human resource limitations. Considering these circumstances, Mexico’s 
hydrocarbon regulators required improved conditions both in terms of their legal design 
as well as of the availability of human and economic resources.2 
 
The limited role of the regulators and their related weakness is particularly noteworthy 
with respect to the enormity in size and power of the companies that they regulate. Before 
the reform, since its establishment in 1995 the CRE has had a maximum number of 
officials of around 200 that are still concentrated in Mexico City, whereas PEMEX GAS 
(PGPB) had thousands of employees scattered throughout the country. In its capacity as a 
company regulated by the CRE, PGPB was joined by other large-scale companies that are 
mainly natural gas transporters and distributors.3 These companies, which also operate in 
the most remote locations of the country and have thousands of kilometers of pipelines 
and areas of distribution,4 must be subject to technical supervision by the CRE, which still 
has scarce human capital with training in engineering or related professions.5 Considering 
this disproportion in numbers and in presence between the CRE and regulated companies, 
and given the lack of studies that evaluate and determine its efficiency, it can be assumed 
that the regulator’s technical control capacities are compromised.  
 
In contrast, the CNH is a newer regulator that was created under different circumstances. 
Here, it is important to point out that the CRE is a body whose establishment was 
motivated by an opening and by an increase in the number of players.6 The CNH, in turn, 
emerged with the uncomfortable role of regulating the operations of PEMEX Exploración 
y Producción (PEP), Mexico’s formerly exclusive operator. During the 2008 reform 
process, the idea arose of creating an entity that would monitor certain technical issues 
related to the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons without PEP losing total 
exclusivity over petroleum operations. However, in an environment without any 
competition, it was reasonable to ask how pertinent the creation of more bureaucracy 
would be for the industry when the CNH’s powers could instead be exercised by the 
Ministry of Energy itself.7 Beyond being technical review authorities, hydrocarbons 
regulators should be forces ordering the market in the areas of exploration and production 
and encouraging competition between different companies. Given PEP’s exclusivity, the 
CNH was impeded from carrying out the main functions of its peers worldwide. In a 
competitive industry, the entry or replacement of a less efficient company by one that is 
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more efficient is an important incentive for compliance with the regulatory framework. In 
the words of Josefina Cortés, the CNH was a “regulator for a single regulated company.”8 
 
However, the 2013 reform would pave the way for many more companies to be regulated, 
by the CRE as well as the CNH. These companies will not only have to face two great powers, 
but rather many more. This time, they will no longer be state-owned energy giants, but 
rather other companies whose direction and interests will be foreign, and maybe even 
contrary, to those of the Mexican state. The new Mexican energy arena is already open to 
private and public companies whose commercial (and political) agenda might be, at least up 
to a certain point, indifferent to that of Mexico, with all the implications that this may have 
for their operations within the country. Considering these circumstances, the debate 
regarding the legal and institutional re-creation of the regulators had to take place 
simultaneously with that addressing the opening of the oil and gas industry.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to conduct a legal analysis of the new model of the 
hydrocarbon regulatory bodies in Mexico. The subject matter of this study is therefore the 
so-called “coordinated regulatory bodies,” which was articulated in Article 28 of the 
Constitution at the time of the December 2013 reform and seems to be somewhat similar 
to the National Council of Energy Policy created by the Brazilian Hydrocarbons Act.9 This 
similarity notwithstanding, “regulative coordination” is typical of the Mexican legal system 
and its introduction was more the result of improvisation than of willingness to implement 
a strict technique of institutional design. As will be shown below, the political agreements 
forged “coordination” as an intermediate scheme between the constitutional autonomy 
granted to the Federal Institute of Telecommunications and the Federal Antitrust 
Commission and the much criticized administrative deconcentration. The first of these 
appeared to provide excessive autonomy to the regulating bodies of the energy sector, an 
industry that up to that point was fully controlled by the public administration, while the 
second was considered very insufficient for the same reason.  
 
After reconstructing the history of how this typically Mexican form came about, it will be 
possible, by understanding its design and assessing some of its competencies, to draw 
preliminary conclusions on how functional and necessary it might be in the future. Here, it 
is important to underscore that these conclusions are highly speculative due to the fact that 
the implementation of the reform is still at an embryonic stage.  
 
One of the main aspects that will be addressed by this study is an assessment of whether 
the new coordinating structure helps to build an industry in a country with proper 
governance and rule of law. As broad as the different meanings of this term may be, we 
have elected the rather narrow definition of “rule of law” provided by attorney and scholar 
Thomas Wälde, which refers to the capacity of the rules and organizations to provide legal 
certainty both for the old and new players in the industry.10 The legal security of the new 
players must be one of the bases for the regulators’ decision-making processes. In this 
regard, Wälde’s concern has focused on whether the law and the organizations that apply it 
are sufficiently solid to withstand the forces that could often compromise the soundness of 
their decisions. Therefore, the assessment of the “coordinated regulatory bodies” will be 
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carried out in light of the following question: through its new structure, have the regulators 
been strengthened with the means to issue stable contracts, ensure fair bidding rounds, and 
avoid bottlenecks in order to facilitate competition? A negative answer could significantly 
affect sustainable openness and should lead to a new public policy proposal. However, this 
chapter puts forth the following conclusion: coordination that is properly articulated 
between the regulatory bodies is very conducive to fostering the success of the new model 
under the conditions that will be discussed at the end of this paper.  
  
The Debate: From Constitutional Autonomy to Coordination  
 
The dismantling of state monopolies would only have meaning with respect to regulators 
that are capable of opening a “fair” entrance for public and private companies, both 
domestic and foreign. Unlike the CRE, which had already regulated private companies 
since the opening of the natural gas market in 1995, the CNH has only just begun to deal 
with companies other than PEMEX. To date, the first three calls for bids for Round One 
have been published,11 and the CNH has only had experience “regulating” PEP mainly 
through establishing technical standards pertaining to industrial safety and the sale of gas, 
issuing nonbinding opinions regarding the assignments granted to it, and validating 
domestic reserves.12 
 
However, beyond the field of energy the context of the national debate surrounding the 
relationship between regulators and regulated companies and between the former and other 
public bodies can be seen. The reform that affected the telecommunications sector and the 
regulation of antitrust policy established some of the scenarios that would have to be 
considered when analyzing activities in the energy sector. By channeling one of the first 
structural reforms enshrined in the Pact for Mexico, the administration of President Enrique 
Peña Nieto identified the common denominator among political trends:13 the public’s 
aversion to monopolies that result in abuses of the user, and the generalized perception that 
the harshness of the former was the result, to a large degree, of an insufficient regulative 
design. The fragility of regulators not only in relation to de facto powers, but also with 
respect to other levels of government, caused the suffering of the users.  
 
Therefore, during the months of debate on the first structural reforms, the political 
discourse focused on condemning the strength of monopolies and pointing out the 
regulators’ weakness. In the midst of this interplay of forces in which regulators had been 
minimized, users remained trapped, held hostage by poor and costly services. Thus, the 
parties would have had to rein in the abuse through the “empowerment” of the regulators 
with respect to the telecommunications and broadcasting giants. Despite the fact that it was 
a very complex discussion, the conclusion was simple and Manichaean: “Monopolies are 
bad and regulation is good.”14 This was the political banner for the reform of competition, 
telecommunications, and radio broadcasting.  
 
Once the constitutional reform in the aforementioned fields and the secondary laws had 
been approved, the government, already opposed by the PRD, was preparing to question the 
functionality of another sector in which were regulators and two so-called monopolies.15 
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However, in contrast with the preceding case, PEMEX’s problems could not be attributed 
exclusively to a weak regulatory system. Within the energy sector, exclusivity was based on 
three constitutional articles that appeared to be dogmas of faith more than legal standards.  
As popular as it was to revile the private monopolies of telecommunications and radio 
broadcasting, it was just as difficult to do so with the public ones. Based on their dual 
character as a company and an entity of assistance,16 denouncing PEMEX’s abuses against its 
users presented complexities in political strategy and social communication.  
 
This was the case because unlike the telecommunications empires, whose services and rates 
were characterized as abusive, part of PEMEX’s woes are due to the fact that it had to carry 
the burden of Mexicans for many years, whether by covering the tax shortfall left by non-
compliant taxpayers or through price controls for fuel. Different studies on the 
beneficiaries of controlled fuel prices showed that they benefit the highest decile of the 
population.17 Based on this context, if PEMEX was seriously damaged, it was because it was 
carrying those who did not even need assistance. In view of this situation, the positions 
hardened. Some were saying to let PEMEX charge what is fair, so that it could reinvest its 
revenue and be efficient. However, others argued that without competition and regulation, 
PEMEX would never be efficient.18  
 
In the case of exploration and production, the proposal to strip PEMEX of its exclusivity 
touched on even more sensitive areas, since it was necessary to argue the dysfunctional 
nature of PEMEX being the only provider of petroleum and the resulting revenue. The 
radical nature of the proposal was based on the debate as to whether it was advisable to 
share the oil-based “economic rent,” which has been the country’s main source of tax 
revenue and of funding for many social programs. Therefore, a quantum leap in the 
political discourse consisted of communicating that PEP would no longer be the sole 
provider of petroleum wealth, but rather a player among peers. The great challenge was to 
convincingly communicate that competition in exploration and production would have a 
positive impact on Mexico and also on PEP, which would need to prepare for the “Iron 
Man” after having rested on its laurels for decades. Therefore, within the new scheme, 
PEMEX would have to engage in the same efforts as any other company to become a 
competitive provider of oil for Mexicans and for the international markets. From the 
reform onward, it would be its implementation capacity and not its constitutional 
foundation that would keep PEMEX as an important operator in the Mexican subsoil. 
 
Moving PEMEX to the center of the value chain made it necessary to reorganize the 
regulatory bodies. In its July 2013 initiative, the National Action Party (PAN) was the first to 
transplant a competitive model for the hydrocarbon industry taken mainly from Colombia 
and Brazil.19 The proposed wording of Articles 25, 27, and 28 of the Constitution broke the 
already fragile levees of the so-called “strategic areas.”20 From the opposition party, which 
was unable to finalize even a much more limited reform in 2008, came a proposal echoing 
the reforms of Norway, Colombia, and Brazil, which were more ambitious.21 Using these 
reforms as references, PEMEX’s dominant position would be assumed by the “nation,” 
which would distribute the contractual areas of exploration and production among the 
most fitting companies and would go on with the construction and operation of refineries, 
Coordination of the Regulators of the Hydrocarbon Sector 
8 
oil pipelines, polyducts, and other infrastructure associated with the distribution and 
trading of hydrocarbons. Under the PAN proposal, the road from the well to the wheel was 
stripped of any barriers to private participation.22  
 
However, the fact that the nation was opening up did not mean that there would no longer 
be any transit authority. Rather, someone would have to patrol both the upstream and 
downstream sectors.23 For exploration and production activities, the CNH would continue to 
be the regulator, with a diversification and increase of powers and of companies it regulated. 
In turn, the CRE would be in charge of regulating activities such as the transportation, 
storage, and distribution of all hydrocarbons and petrochemicals without being limited to 
natural gas, as it had been up to that point. By significantly increasing the regulators’ 
workload, it was foreseeable that both the academic and industrial sectors would start 
reflecting on the limitations imposed on these regulators within their respective mandates.24  
 
Similar to what happened in the telecommunications sector, criticism of the energy 
industry regulators was particularly related to their lack of autonomy, even though the 
CRE and the CNH had their own laws25 and their own set of powers allowing them to issue 
resolutions—at times controversial26—that could not be appealed by the Ministry of 
Energy. Even within the framework for administrative deconcentration, in which 
regulators were ascribed within the Ministry of Energy, the technical and managerial 
autonomy provided by their laws gave them a certain measure of freedom of to act 
according to their own criteria.27 Nonetheless, the command structure of the energy sector 
made it very difficult for industry regulators to freely make decisions that many times 
were repellent to state-regulated entities. 
 
Prior to the 2013 reform, both the CRE and the CNH were deconcentrated bodies of the 
Ministry of Energy whose greatest protection were the laws that had established them and 
that gave them technical and administrative autonomy.28 However, they continued to be 
attached to this ministry, which prevented them from preparing and having their own 
budget. Therefore, the exercise of the powers assigned to both institutions by these laws 
was decidedly restricted by the budget that the ministry decided to allocate to them. On 
the other hand, prior to the 2011 constitutional reform, which approved the ratification of 
the regulatory bodies’ commissioners by the Senate, their designation depended entirely 
on the proposal submitted by the Ministry of Energy to the President of the Republic.29 
Therefore, the commissions were linked, to some degree, to the minister in office and even 
to the president, which could compromise some of its most important decisions.  
 
An important structural aspect that has affected the CNH and the CRE’s capacity to regulate 
PEMEX has been the status of the Minister of Energy as president of PEMEX’s board of 
directors. Even though the minister is not hierarchically superior to the CRE and CNH 
commissioners, the degree of his or her political influence over them has had an impact on 
some of their decisions. It is dysfunctional that someone who dictates a policy of regulation 
is simultaneously the president of the board of a company being regulated.30 This double 
function of the minister has, at times, rendered the regulators’ resolutions pointless and has 
even caused indecisiveness in terms of the implementation of its policies.31 
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Based on this assumption, the PAN initiative proposed that the regulatory bodies of the 
energy sector would follow the same route as those for telecommunications and 
competition.32 This means that the PAN put constitutional autonomy of the regulators on 
the negotiating table. They would be immune to pressure both from PEMEX itself as well 
as from other cabinet members, including the minister of energy. Likewise, they would 
have budgetary autonomy and could finally increase their staffing level and their 
contracting of specialized consulting. Such an opening would entail an exponential 
increase in their tasks; it was therefore imperative to guarantee the budget and human 
resources so that they would be able to be fulfilled. 
 
The PAN proposal reflected the correct assessment that after 76 years of a pathological 
endogamy between PEMEX, SENER, the CRE, and the CNH, it was necessary to create 
sufficient institutional distance for each of these entities to fulfill its role. In this way, 
SENER, as the head of the sector, could not disrupt decisions made by the regulators, and 
PEMEX could not evade regulatory action through SENER.  
 
However, once the draft of the constitutional reform initiatives was issued and in the 
absence of a PRI proposal for a regulatory model, it was resolved that constitutional 
autonomy was not a suitable model for the new bodies. Some of the more lucid reflections 
are due to Dr. José Roldán Xopa, who, in stating the reasons for constitutional autonomy, 
discarded the notion that such autonomy was suitable for the performance of the 
regulators’ tasks.33 Roldán argues that regulatory action is mainly an accumulation of 
administrative functions and that, for the same reason, these bodies tend to be attached to 
the public administration with a legal architecture protecting them against political 
pressure.34 However, since they remain within the public administration, they are subject 
to the planning instruments originating from it.  
 
In terms of the establishment of an autonomous constitutional body to regulate 
telecommunications, Roldán’s criticism is right on the mark. As instruments created by the 
executive branch of the federal government, in a strict sense neither the National 
Development Plan nor the energy sector’s program would need to be followed by a body 
of this nature. The same would be the case in the energy sector. Had the CRE and the CNH 
been recreated as autonomous constitutional bodies, their actions would not need to follow 
the provisions in the National Development Plan, the Energy Industry Plan, or the 
different national energy strategies. This could create important gaps, not only in terms of 
implementation, but also in the very design of public policies. Furthermore, the transition 
from a model with intense interference from the government in everything concerning the 
sector to one where regulators would become untouchable was politically and functionally 
unviable. Shielding the energy sector regulators in such a manner would have meant giving 
them a role of utmost power at a very delicate point in the consolidation of the reform. 
Without a doubt, the opening of hydrocarbon activities required autonomy for the 
regulators, since it would be important to send the correct signals to the markets. However, 
the fragmentation of the sector was a possibility that could result from the establishment of 
autonomous constitutional bodies.  
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Therefore, the challenge for the parties was to find middle ground for the regulators between 
the already outdated administrative deconcentration and the newly implemented 
constitutional autonomy for other regulators, which was deemed inappropriate for the 
energy industry. The legislative debate determined that although the regulators needed 
some separation to be free to make technical decisions regarding the sector, excessive 
distance could cause serious coordination problems with the remainder of the government.35 
Therefore, the idea of leaving the regulators outside of the radius of the federal government 
was losing force and drive as the constitutional reform was being drafted.  
 
Against this background, the solution devised by the PRI and the PAN in the draft 
submitted on December 20, 2013 turned out to be a model without any precedent in the 
international industry. The text of Article 28 of the Constitution created the “coordinated 
regulatory bodies” whose meaning and implications would not be clarified until April of 
the following year, when the initiatives of the secondary laws regarding energy matters 
were issued. The draft of the Coordinated Regulatory Bodies Law, approved by both 
chambers of the legislature the same year, shed more light on the recently coined term in 
Article 28 of the constitutional text.  
 
According to the Constitution, regulatory coordination is limited to the CRE and the CNH; 
their function is the orderly establishment of a new industry model, whose new and most 
noteworthy characteristic is competition along the entire value chain of hydrocarbons. This 
means that within their expanded sphere of power, the main task of these regulators is to 
restructure the hydrocarbon and electricity industries through an increase in investment, 
innovation, and efficiency in both fields of activity within a competitive environment.36 As 
far as hydrocarbons are concerned, the CNH would, among other tasks, be in charge of 
launching exploration and production contracts in international markets for companies 
other than PEMEX to participate in the increase of reserves and production of hydrocarbons 
at the lowest possible cost and with the greatest economic participation of the state. This is 
intended to ensure domestic supply and maximize petroleum revenue.37 In turn, the CRE 
would be responsible for the regulation of very different activities: regulating the prices of 
some hydrocarbons, oil, and petrochemicals; establishing rates for their transportation, 
storage, and distribution; designing contracts; and granting related permits.38 
 
In sum, the law establishes that the coordinated regulatory bodies remain attached to the 
federal government. Without being properly decentralized agencies, they share certain 
attributes such as legal personality; increased budgetary, technical, and managerial 
autonomy; and the possibility of collecting income through the duties paid for the 
administrative processes they carry out. The budget issue and the withholding of income 
from the payment of fees represent a substantial improvement for these bodies, which 
used to be exclusively funded by the Ministry of Energy.39  
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Therefore, the general characteristics of these bodies are the following:40 
• Both the CNH and the CRE have a governing body made up of seven 
commissioners, including the chairperson, in addition to a technical secretary. 
• The commissioners are appointed as follows: the executive branch proposes a list of 
three names for each office, one of which is selected and ratified by the Senate and 
can be removed from office only in the case of faults set forth in the law.  
 
In addition to those vested in them by the Hydrocarbons Act, the general powers of both 
regulatory bodies are the following: 
• To issue instruments of regulation for the activities within their jurisdiction.  
• To approve their own budgets, which will be sent to the Ministry of the Treasury for 
approval by Congress.  
• To submit technical information to the Ministry of Energy and to any other agency 
for the preparation of the National Development Plan and the Industry Program.  
• To direct and prepare technical studies for matters within its jurisdiction.  
 
In particular, the CNH remains the regulating body of the “upstream” side of the domestic 
hydrocarbon industry and carries out the following functions:41 
• Regulates and supervises the exploitation and extraction of hydrocarbons, which is 
its fundamental purpose.  
• Promotes, awards, and carries out the exploration and production contracts as well 
as the petroleum assignments42 held by PEMEX.  
• Supervises exploration and production projects to guarantee optimal recovery.  
• Promotes the restoration of reserves as the basis for national energy security. 
• Ensures the use of the best technology for the exploration and extraction of 
hydrocarbons.  
• Establishes the nation’s hydrocarbons information center.  
On the other hand, the objectives of the CRE are the following:43  
• To regulate and promote efficient operation of the transportation, storage, 
distribution, compression, liquefaction, and regasification of hydrocarbons, as well 
as their sale to the public.  
• To regulate the transportation, storage, and sale of biofuels.  
• To promote the safe, stable, and efficient supply of energy resources.  
 
So far, the description of the regulatory bodies has not yet made any reference to their 
greatest peculiarity: the fact that they are both subject to the so-called “Coordinating 
Council of the Energy Sector,” which is presided over by the minister of energy and 
composed of the presiding commissioners of both the CNH and the CRE, the deputy 
ministers of the sector, and the general directors of the National Energy Control Center 
and the National Gas Center.44  
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The law also lists the functions of said council, among which the following are noteworthy:  
• To inform the regulating bodies of the “energy policy” set forth by the ministry.  
• To issue recommendations that, in matters of energy policy, may include the 
regulatory bodies in their work programs, and in turn, to analyze the proposals of 
said regulatory bodies in matters of energy policies and programs.  
• To analyze specific cases “that may affect the development of the public policies of 
the executive branch in energy matters and propose coordination mechanisms.”  
 
This council is the channel through which the Mexican legislation chose to embody the 
coordination in its entirety, although its significance or efficacy is not entirely clear. What 
does it mean that this council is a space of knowledge for regulators in matters of energy 
policy, assuming that this is something that could be specified in a council? On the other 
hand, how will the analysis of specific cases be conducted and what will be the 
methodology used? What will the purposes of this analysis be? The same issue applies to 
the issuing of recommendations, which is utterly generalized in the law. From this 
perspective, the significance of the constitutional innovation designated as the 
“coordinated regulatory body” cannot be discerned, even though coordination of 
regulatory bodies exists in other parts of the world and has contributed to improving the 
operating conditions of the industries. 
 
However, it should be emphasized that the Ministry of Energy being the chairman of this 
council is at least uncomfortable—not necessarily because of his office as such, but rather 
because he is also the president of the board of directors of PEMEX, which puts him in an 
obvious conflict of interest. It is preoccupying, to say the least, that the coordinator of the 
regulators is the president of one of the largest companies they regulate and undoubtedly 
the most complex company to expose to competition. We will have to see if in the future, 
there are signs that the credibility of the regulators has been compromised by indicating 
some bias either in favor of or against PEMEX in their decisions. It is clear that this could 
occur with or without the leadership of the minister of energy on the council in question.  
 
The New Platform of Regulation: A Space Shared Between Regulators 
 
The “old” industry was based on two state-owned energy giants that were surrounded, on a 
secondary level, by some private companies that depended on them to some degree. In 
terms of hydrocarbons, PEP was beyond the scope of any regulator for many years, until the 
CNH was created in 2008. Oil exploration and production were activities exclusively 
reserved for PEMEX, as were oil transportation, storage, and trading. While exploration and 
production were regulated in a limited manner by the CNH, the transportation, storage, and 
trading of oil (and its derivatives) were subject to rules of self-regulation by PEP itself. Based 
on this state of affairs, in matters of oil, the formula was simple: the only entity producing, 
transporting, and trading oil was PEMEX through PEP and PMI, respectively.45 
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Something different was happening with the gas sector, where the government had carried 
out a partial liberalization. While the exploration and production of domestic gas remained 
the exclusive domain of PEMEX, the import, transportation, storage, and distribution of 
gas were opened up to private investment. Therefore, in the industry, there were two 
spheres that hardly communicated on a regulatory level. On one hand, there were the 
extractive and industrial processes of oil and gas, monopolized by PEMEX and partially 
regulated by the CNH (in terms of extraction); on the other, there was a realm less 
regulated by the CRE. What is important to emphasize here is that these two spheres of 
regulation rarely ever came into contact and that coordination between regulators was 
therefore unnecessary. In practice, the simplicity of the industry model—due to the great 
concentration of activities in PEMEX—made comprehensive institutional coordination 
efforts unnecessary. If there was something to coordinate, it was perhaps sufficient to make 
calls between government offices.  
 
The significant potential growth in the number of players involved in hydrocarbons 
activities put an end to the square formed by SENER, PEMEX, the CRE, and the CNH, 
where there was no significant communication between the latter two. The new legal 
framework created the room for many more players; thus, the powers of the regulators did 
not only multiply but also required a coherent and functional system. Without a doubt, this 
new scenario will require the authorities to become aware that increased communication 
and coordination between regulators is necessary. The inconsistency in the application of 
policies between hydrocarbon extraction projects and those involving their transportation, 
storage, and distribution might cause the industry to become disrupted. 
 
So far, we have discussed the reasons for the establishment of the council, although we 
have not stated its risks. It must be remembered that the final version of the council was 
weaker than the initial proposal, in which it was not very clear whether the council’s 
opinions were binding for the regulators.46 When the first “coordination” outlines were 
prepared, they seemed to tend toward subordinating the regulatory bodies to the council, 
whose chairman is the minister of energy. This would have been contrary to the 
aspirations stated by the reformers of the Constitution to create more autonomous 
regulators. For this reason, the language that seemed to obligate the regulatory bodies to 
comply with the determinations of the council disappeared from the draft that was 
approved. Although it is evident that in Congress the balance was tipped toward autonomy 
of the regulators, it is not clear what function this new model of coordination of 
coordination is supposed to have. The imprecise language indicates a lack of maturity in 
the design of the coordination model, when it could be very useful for the effective 
materialization of the new organization of the hydrocarbon industry in Mexico. The model 
that was barely outlined in the constitutional text was not properly developed in the 
secondary legislation, even though—as we will see below—coordination between 
regulatory bodies is a trend that is increasingly recognized as a new way of designing the 
interaction between organizations with high degrees of specialization.  
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Regulated Autonomy: Beyond the Oxymoron 
 
Unlike the autonomy of the regulatory agencies, their coordination has received little 
attention under administrative law. In Mexico’s case, the autonomy of the energy sector’s 
regulators especially concerns their capacity to create an environment of credibility for the 
general public and for investors in particular. This credibility must be fundamentally 
affirmed with respect to PEMEX and the CFE, which must be considered in their new 
status as just two more competitors within the energy sector. For this reason, the regulatory 
agencies must keep a distance from those who might have a direct interest in favoring the 
former monopolies, specifically including the minister of energy—who, as we have said, 
acts as the president of the Coordinating Council.47 In this respect, coordination could be 
viewed as a threat to autonomy, although we have already stated in this paper that the 
regulatory design of the council’s functions does not lead to major conclusions regarding 
the impact it might have on the autonomy of these bodies. As a matter of fact, the purpose 
that the coordination of regulatory bodies in Mexico strives to achieve is not clear. 
 
In any case, coordination is an issue of organizational design that is receiving a growing 
interest in the specialized literature.48 Coordination can ultimately improve the conditions 
of legal security in regulated sectors to the extent that it can contribute to “maximizing the 
strengths of the shared regulatory space” by reducing the risks of duplication 
fragmentation, and overlapping of these bodies’ tasks. At the same time, this may work in 
favor of the regulators’ functionality by increasing their effectiveness and efficiency, as well 
as the soundness of their decisions.49 
 
Coordination is especially desirable in an environment in which the specialization of 
regulatory bodies is continually increasing. This specialization has turned some regulators 
into closed containers without any communication channels between them.50 We have 
already stated that both the CRE and the CNH existed in their own spaces with very little 
contact, since one regulated a sector that was under a monopoly, while the other was 
already handling the opening of the gas industry. We have also pointed out that as a result 
of the reform, there are no longer any exclusive areas of regulation and that the regulatory 
space resulting from the reform is unified and shared. The removal of exclusivity means 
the elimination of specialization of these bodies due to coordination, in which case 
coordination would no longer be compared to fragmentation. It should be added that 
according to the specialized literature, fragmentation resulting from a lack of coordination 
can negatively impact the equal treatment of regulated companies, due to the potential 
inconsistency between the decisions of one regulator and those of another. Moreover, 
fragmentation could also become a shield from responsibility, as the woes of the regulated 
companies (or users) might always be the fault of the “other regulator.” Finally, the absence 
of communication between regulators can lead to transaction costs for companies and 
“blind spots” in terms of the implementation of public policies.51  
 
So far, we have argued that coordination as such may create many advantages, even with 
the risk that in specific cases, the autonomy of the regulators may be compromised. This 
happens especially in cases where the regulating bodies are coordinated in a compulsory 
Coordination of the Regulators of the Hydrocarbon Sector 
15 
manner and through a centralized power. This would be the case in Mexico, considering 
that the regulatory bodies are coordinated by constitutional mandate and are under the 
leadership of the minister of energy. However, it is noteworthy that neither the law that 
regulates these coordinated regulatory bodies nor any other regulatory body of lesser 
standing precisely establishes more than one of the coordination mechanisms 
recommended by international practices, as detailed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Coordination Mechanisms Recommended by International Practices 
 
1. Procedural Mechanisms  2. Structural Mechanisms 
Adoption of decisions issued vertically 
and unilaterally by a hierarchically 
superior authority, such as the minister 
of energy, who would have powers of 
veto and annulment.  
Relocation of competencies (e.g., bring 
together or concentrate closely related 
competencies in a single body) 
Compulsory/non-compulsory adoption 
of recommendations by experts.  
Establishment of a hierarchically 
superior body to coordinate the entities.  
Adoption of compulsory negotiation 
mechanisms.  
Establishment of a body that is not 
hierarchically superior to coordinate  
the entities.  
Joint decision-making mechanisms of the 
regulators.  
Establishment of mechanisms for  
the exchange of information through 
databases.  
Signing of institutional agreements. 
Space for the non-compulsory 
consultation of experts.  
 
Decision platforms with processes  
that require approval by regulators 
participating in this coordination before 
being approved. 
 
 
Regarding the mechanisms detailed in the above table, the following will be mentioned: the 
Coordinated Regulatory Bodies Law only includes “the establishment of a hierarchically 
superior body to coordinate the entities.” However, we have already argued that the meaning 
of this hierarchically superior body is not clear. On the other hand, Mexican law excluded 
the possibility for a higher authority to review or annul decisions by the regulators. In 
Mexico, where the discourse regarding autonomy has been fierce, this would be politically 
very unpopular, even though the de facto autonomy of regulators is constantly questioned.  
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The New Space of Regulation in Mexico: From the Well to the Wheel 
 
In terms of the competencies of regulators, two of the most important for organizing and 
streamlining a market are the issuance of contracts and permits, as they will be the 
qualifying titles for new players in this area. We refer here to the CNH’s role in the bidding 
for exploration and production contracts as well as the CRE’s role in granting permits and 
setting rates for the transportation of oil, petroleum, and petrochemicals. The impact that 
the competitiveness of the contracts and the permits of the hydrocarbons sector will have 
on the entry of new players cannot be underestimated. Without exploration and 
production contracts that are able to guarantee a solid quantity and quality of operating 
companies, and without a policy of permits and rates that is transparent and commercially 
attractive, the new hydrocarbon industry in Mexico will only be developed with great 
difficulty. Moreover, it is of utmost importance that while promoting exploration and 
production projects, government players keep the conditions of the infrastructure to 
transport, store, distribute and market the hydrocarbons that are produced and/or 
industrialized in mind. To do so, there must be consistency between the policies of 
contractual preparation and of setting infrastructure rates.52 
 
In light of the foregoing, the Coordinating Council could be very useful to ensure that the 
contractual designs are in compliance with the policies for granting and pricing 
downstream infrastructure. Proper communication between the Ministry of Energy, the 
two regulators, and the independent operator for the transportation of natural gas would 
require opening channels for the proper integration of the industry into a coherent and 
functional system.53 However, for this it is necessary to first understand the institutional 
framework involved both in the issuance of contracts as well as in the mechanisms for 
fixing permits and rates, as will be explained below. 
 
One of the most notorious aspects of the 2013 reform was the change in the contractual 
paradigm. The reform radically expanded the type of petroleum contracts that could be 
offered in Mexico: it eliminated PEMEX as the only contracting entity and replaced it with 
the CNH. Until then, PEMEX had been designing the contracts, putting them up for 
bidding, and awarding them, in such a manner that it was both the party and administrator. 
Since PEMEX was the exclusive operator, its ubiquity in the contracting processes was 
significant, since it hoarded everything contracted by it. Nonetheless, the desire to increase 
operators in the country made it inconsistent to allow PEMEX to maintain control of the 
processes of contractual design, bidding, and administration. As a competitor, PEMEX 
would need to be kept on the sidelines of contractual procedures where it had been able to 
pull all the strings.54 
 
For this reason, the actions and decisions related to the issuance and awarding of contracts 
remained outside of PEMEX’s control and were organized in the following manner: The 
technical and commercial design of the contracts are now carried out by the Ministry of 
Energy with the technical assistance of the CNH. In turn, the economic formula will be 
designed by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. As soon as the contract has been 
designed, it will be put up for bidding and will be awarded and administered by the CNH.55 
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This division of competencies in contractual matters is atypical in the international 
industry and was justified in Mexico “as a system of checks and balances” to avoid having 
the contractual decisions reside within a single authority. However, it is questionable 
whether the different aspects of an oil contract need to be written by organizations whose 
power is clearly uneven and that respond to different incentives. There is no comparison, 
for example, between the force of the Ministry of Finance and that of the CNH. 
Furthermore, due to its enormous influence over budgetary matters, it could be said that 
the former would be able to even crush the Ministry of Energy. Therefore, it appears that a 
system of “checks and balances” could in reality function as the submission of the drafters 
of the technical and commercial aspects to the fiscal authority.  
 
If this were the case, Mexico could start its road toward the exploration and production 
market with contracts characterized by low commercial appeal, since it is not the role of a 
fiscal authority to create commercially attractive transactions. Furthermore, the goals 
pursued by SENER and the CNH are opposed to those of the Ministry of Finance. The 
former must attract investors so that Mexico can select the most efficient operators, 
whereas the latter, due to its nature, must focus on the collection of oil revenues. The 
former must look for companies that have the best performance in the restitution of 
reserves and production of barrels under the best conditions of technological progress, 
safety, and environmental protection. The latter is only interested in collecting oil rent. 
Therefore, a contract designed by separate entities—and for purposes that may be 
incompatible—might present serious problems of coherence and competitiveness in the 
market. In view of the foregoing, coordination within the above-mentioned council could 
serve as a space to reconcile these discrepancies.  
 
Another important issue is the “political” nature of the Ministry of Finance vs. the 
“technical” profile of the regulators. In the case of Mexico, there has been a pattern of 
appointing ministers of energy who are strongly linked to the president, while possessing 
experience in the energy sector has hardly been relevant. Therefore, rather than achieving 
technical goals that might not contribute to political popularity, the main function of the 
different ministers of energy has been to carry out the intentions of the president. In turn, 
through the mechanisms of appointment and removal, the office of commissioner is more 
stable than that of the minister, considering that the latter can be appointed and removed 
by the president.  
 
Within a delicate political context such as that of the hydrocarbons reform, we believe that 
the concentration of the jurisdiction over the contractual design within the Ministry of 
Energy could lead to inconsistency in the contractual models in the case of a change in 
minister or in the event that political or economic circumstances force the same minister 
to formulate different models. It would send a signal of inconsistency to the market, which 
would reduce the credibility of the reform and the rule of law in general in Mexico, if this 
credibility is understood as a set of predictable legal conditions.  
 
The issue of permits and rates for midstream facilities primarily concerns the CRE. As a 
relevant precedent, the difficult role that the CRE had to play within the energy sector for 
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two decades in its capacity as the regulator of prices and rates for domestic natural gas is 
known. As such, the CRE has encountered resistance from PEMEX in implementing a 
specific “open access” policy, in which the latter would have to make its transportation 
infrastructure available to third parties even when the gas injected did not come from 
PEMEX. Since 1995, the CRE has had the very complicated task of the “vertical 
disintegration” of PEMEX Gas in a situation where it was dominant both in the provision of 
the gas itself as well as in gas transportation services. After twenty years of attempting to 
carry out this change, the regulator has not yet succeeded, and PEMEX has continued to 
own the gas and maintain control over the pipelines.56 
 
For this reason, the 2013 reform promoted the creation of an “independent operator” of 
the pipeline system called the National Gas Center (CENAGAS),57 which must facilitate the 
task of the regulator—guaranteeing open access—by providing clear signals of the cost and 
availability of natural gas transportation in Mexico. In other words, the reform was 
intended to put an end to PEMEX’s dominance by eliminating its ownership of and control 
over the gas pipelines, so that anyone who requires the service can utilize available 
capacity. This is an important signal to encourage the entry of new gas producers, who 
must receive proper assurances that there will be transportation for their products or that 
they will be able to connect with the existing transportation system in order to reach 
centers of consumption.  
 
For these reasons, CENAGAS is a part of the Coordinating Council of Regulators of the 
Energy Sector. The information that CENAGAS provides regarding the capacity and cost of 
natural gas transportation will be crucial for the development of new infrastructure. In 
sum, the new operator will be in charge of opening the “black boxes” that prevented access 
to the information that would, on one hand, permit “open access” to PEMEX’s pipelines, 
and on the other hand, provide knowledge of the costs for the construction and regulation 
of new infrastructure. This is expected to put an end to PEMEX’s dominance so that those 
who require transportation can use the already existing system58 or construct and 
interconnect new networks without any threat from PEMEX. 
 
Moreover, in addition to the pending challenges in terms of natural gas, the CRE is now in 
charge of regulating the transportation activities of all liquid hydrocarbons, 
petrochemicals, and biofuels in a scenario that lacks a precedent of opening. This is 
happening at a time when the CRE lacks even the human resources to request, process, and 
manage the information concerning the entirety of PEMEX’s transportation systems of all 
hydrocarbons. It should be pointed out that in the absence of this information, the 
development of the value chain—from exploration and production to the trading of oil and 
petrochemicals—will be substantially delayed.  
 
The carrying out of the competencies recently acquired by the CRE is very complex, since 
it will require penetrating areas where PEMEX has enjoyed exclusivity for decades. Since 
its establishment, PEMEX has not had to transmit any information regarding the operating 
conditions of its oil pipelines, polyducts, and other infrastructure related to the 
transportation of hydrocarbons, oil, and petrochemicals. Therefore, assuming that PEMEX 
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is actually willing, the complexities of transmitting the information and its processing and 
administration still remain.  
 
It is important to point out that unlike the natural gas system, for the remainder of the 
transportation systems there is no independent operator who transmits the necessary 
information regarding their operational and economic conditions. Therefore, in this case, 
the CRE will once again face PEMEX without a mediator, as it has been doing for 20 years 
during the process of implementing the natural gas reform—a period of time during which 
it has not achieved the implementation of an open-access policy. 
 
Within this context, coordination could be useful, to the extent that it would help to achieve an 
approach to determine the steps necessary for PEMEX to provide information on these assets 
in a much more expedient and efficient manner. The joint participation of the Ministry of 
Energy, CENAGAS, and the chairpersons of the regulatory agencies may be very useful in 
articulating the actions necessary to expedite access to information regarding the operation of 
this infrastructure, whose absence would hinder the development of the industry.  
 
However, whether this council will actually assist in the work of the downstream regulator 
will to a large extent depend on the political willingness to go ahead with the total opening 
of PEMEX, not just in terms of competition in exploration and production but also the use 
of its infrastructure. Without a doubt, this will be a change that will be difficult to 
implement because it exposes PEMEX to practices that were entirely foreign to it as a 
monopoly and that, we insist, are indispensable for the development of the industry.  
 
In light of the above, one of the greatest challenges will be to achieve consensus regarding 
the need to open up the sector in its entirety, regardless of the political cost. This involves 
the reaction of public opinion, the trade unions, and the opposition parties to the fact that 
from now on, PEMEX must openly share information with the regulator that it was not 
previously sharing with any authority because it was considered “strategic information.” 
Without a doubt, this is a very complex process during which the CRE will require the 
support of the council in its effort to compel PEMEX to accept the dynamics of 
competition and efficiency as a result of the implementation of an open-access policy. 
Otherwise, the signal that would be sent to the international markets is that in spite of 
being a public entity, PEMEX is ungovernable. It would send the erroneous message that 
by being linked with the government, PEMEX is exempt from compliance with the rules 
and, therefore, the rule of law.  
 
Conclusions and Outlook 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to appraise the capacity of the new design of the 
regulatory bodies to achieve the effective opening of the hydrocarbons sector under 
conditions of legal security for all players—whether the investment is new or already 
existing. Remember that according to the concept of Thomas Wälde, the rule of law entails 
the rule enforcers’ resistance to political temptations, which permits predicting future 
industry conditions.  
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In this paper, we have seen that one of the goals of the reform was to create a regulatory 
environment that would foster the creation of competitive industry in a very complex 
political ambit. We have seen that the creation of regulatory agencies that are able to resist 
political pressures and maintain firm technical resolutions was covered by two different 
proposals during the debate of the constitutional reform and approval of the secondary 
laws. The first plan, proposed by the PAN, was to recreate them as autonomous 
constitutional organizations, which was rejected because it was deemed that the regulatory 
agencies could not be removed from the government bodies. The second proposal 
consisted of the implementation of the “coordinated regulatory bodies,” which has been 
covered by our analysis in this chapter.  
 
In conclusion, after analyzing the “coordinated regulatory bodies,” we observe the 
following: at this very early stage of the implementation of the reform, it cannot yet been 
stated with any accuracy the direction the industry will take under this new system. 
Because it remains very much undefined in the legislation, the Council of Regulatory 
Agencies of the Energy Sector could have positive effects if it serves as a true channel of 
communication between the authorities involved in the hydrocarbons sector; it could 
likewise serve as a means to pressure regulators if inconvenient resolutions are issued. 
However, it must be emphasized that the law does not authorize this council to instruct the 
regulators. In any case, if there is any pressure on the regulators, it could happen with or 
without the actions of the council.  
 
To sum things up, at this point in the implementation of the reform, we believe that the 
new organization of the regulatory bodies has an uncertain future that depends to a great 
extent on how coordination is used over the medium and long term. It remains to be seen 
whether this council effectively meets the goals for which it was created and, even more 
importantly, reviews the types of issues that they address and sets precedents regarding 
their effects. Now, at a time when new investment is yet to arrive and there are no data 
regarding the functioning of the council, it would be difficult and premature to venture 
any conclusions regarding its functionality.  
 
For the time being, we can conclude that some steps have indeed turned out to be positive 
for the regulatory agencies. The fact that they now have legal personality and can submit a 
budget independently puts them in a more advantageous position compared to the earlier 
model. However, at the time of writing this chapter, the substantial increases in budget and 
human capital that they require to comply with their greatly expanded powers and 
functions have not yet fully materialized.  
 
More than anything, there is no better help for regulators than governments’ commitment 
to reach specific goals of public policy. Until now, Mexico has been very ambivalent in 
terms of living up to its commitment of creating competition in the energy sector. To the 
extent that this ambivalence prevails, it will be difficult to maintain strong regulation, 
under any legal framework.  
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